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A pluralistic approach to global poverty
CARL KNIGHT*
Abstract. A large proportion of humankind today lives in avoidable poverty. This article
examines whether aﬄuent individuals and governments have moral duties to change this
situation. It is maintained that an alternative to the familiar accounts of transdomestic
distributive justice and personal ethics put forward by writers such as Peter Singer, John
Rawls, and Thomas Pogge is required, since each of these accounts fails to reflect the full range
of relevant considerations. A better account would give some weight to overall utility, the
condition of the worst oﬀ, and individual responsibility. This approach provides robust
support to global poverty alleviation.
Introduction
Some two and a half billion people – two-fifths of the world’s population – live on
less than $2 per day. Over a billion people do not have access to clean drinking water
and 800 million suﬀer from hunger and malnutrition.1 These facts, and many others
illustrating the extent, severity and eﬀects of world poverty, are well known by the
governments of aﬄuent countries. Thanks, in part, to recent high profile campaigns,
the general public are also aware of their broad shape. Yet these facts alone do not
oﬀer us a guide to action.
In the first place, there is the question of what, if anything, can be done to reduce
world poverty, and related phenomena such as food and clean water shortages. If
nothing could be done about global poverty, the facts before us would remain
dismaying – horrifying, even – but lose any moral hold they might have on us, since
ought implies can. But in fact many things can be done to reduce poverty, as every
developed country accepts. And while the developed countries are doing some of
these things, through both direct aid and international development organisations,
they could clearly do much more. There is huge wealth in advanced industrial
societies, and means by which larger portions of this wealth could be converted into
more eﬀective assistance for the global poor.
These issues of feasibility are vitally important, but they are not the main focus of
this article. Rather, I will be concerned with moral considerations – that is, with what
aﬄuent individuals and governments ought to do, given that global poverty is a fact,
and that doing more than we presently do about it is feasible. And I will be
* Earlier versions of this article were presented at the University of Brighton and the University of
Stirling. I would like to thank the participants on these occasions, as well as Thom Brooks and two
anonymous referees, for their helpful comments.
1 United Nations Development Programme, 2006 Annual Report, p. 8.
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particularly concerned with the insights shed on the problem by contemporary
anglophone accounts of distributive justice. In my view, the most plausible position
will combine the central considerations of two such accounts with those of a much
older view of right and wrong. Yet one need not subscribe to any view this specific to
reach the conclusion that present day global poverty is a most grave moral wrong.
Those who subscribe to any one of these accounts (at least, in their most plausible
construals), or any combination of them, should reach this conclusion. World poverty
is perhaps exceptional in being opposed from so many otherwise conflicting perspec-
tives. In the rush to stake their distinctive positions on transdomestic distributive
justice,2 philosophers have made surprisingly little of this remarkable fact.
The discussion begins with the aforementioned older view of right and wrong –
that of utilitarianism. Two subsequent sections each consider a prominent recent
approach to distributive justice: first, the Rawlsian approach, which focuses in
particular on improving the standing of the worst oﬀ; and second, a post-Rawlsian
approach which, though formulated in diﬀerent ways by Thomas Pogge and luck
egalitarians, is characterised by a focus on responsibility considerations. In each case,
the central concern is with how these approaches have been applied to transdomestic
distributive justice, the extent to which this application is plausible, whether a
superior alternative application is available, and what these various applications have
to say about the issue of world poverty.
An additional concern is with personal ethics, or more specifically, with what each
aﬄuent individual ought to do according to each of these approaches, and their
various transdomestic applications. This is appropriate in the case of utilitarianism
and, as I will construe it, luck egalitarianism, since these positions are ‘monistic’ in
the sense of denying ‘the specific claim that the two practical problems of institutional
design and personal conduct require, at the fundamental level, two diﬀerent kinds of
practical principle’.3 It is also appropriate when considering Pogge’s work since,
though he denies monism, he defends a particular ‘dualist’ position (that is one which
accepts the above ‘specific claim’) that sets out demanding requirements for
individual conduct regarding world poverty.4 Although John Rawls was less
forthcoming on such questions, there may be grounds for devising a Rawlsian
personal ethics.5
Utilitarianism
The principle of utility was famously formulated by Jeremy Bentham in his
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation as ‘that principle which
2 I adopt the unusual language of ‘transdomestic justice’ since this seems neutral in a way that more
common terms such as ‘international justice’ and ‘global justice’ are not. For useful discussion see
Onora O’Neill, Bounds of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 115; Simon
Caney, Justice Beyond Borders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 2. I prefer my term to
O’Neill’s ‘transnational justice’ since it seems to carry even less unnecessary baggage.
3 Liam Murphy, ‘Institutions and the Demands of Justice’, Philosophy and Public Aﬀairs, 27 (1999),
pp. 251–91, at p. 254.
4 See Thomas Pogge, ‘On the Site of Distributive Justice: Reflections on Cohen and Murphy’,
Philosophy and Public Aﬀairs, 29 (2000), pp. 137–69 and World Poverty and Human Rights
(Cambridge: Polity, 2002).
5 See note 53 below and the attached text.
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approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which
it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest
is in question’.6 It is curious that, in this initial formulation, Bentham leaves open the
question of who the party in question actually is.
For our purposes, there seem to be two key questions regarding application of the
principle of utility. Which party’s happiness is to be maximised? And what
implications does this maximisation have for the aﬄuent world’s response to global
poverty? In the Introduction, Bentham focuses on the domestic case, and holds that
the appropriate party to consider is the community as a whole, the community’s
happiness being just the sum of its members’ happiness. But his posthumously
published Principles of International Law treats the relevant party in the trans-
domestic case as the nations concerned, the end being the ‘common and equal utility
of all nations’.7 Modern day utilitarians have increasingly taken the global popu-
lation as the relevant party. Peter Singer, in particular, has focused on the question
of world poverty, and the discussion in his influential 1972 article ‘Famine, Aﬄuence,
and Morality’ is enlightening for our purposes.8
Singer starts with an assumption that he feels will be acceptable to most: ‘that
suﬀering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad’. Next, he
suggests two versions of what I will call the prevention principle: the first, stronger
version is that, ‘if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening,
without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought,
morally, to do it’; the second, weaker version is that, ‘if it is in our power to prevent
something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally
significant, we ought, morally, to do it’.9 To illustrate the application of the principle,
he imagines walking past a shallow pond, and seeing a child drowning in it. In this
case, it is uncontroversial that the child should be rescued, since the death of the child
would be very bad, while the muddying of clothes involved in the rescue is
insignificant.
While in many contexts such as this individuals routinely act on the prevention
principle, Singer urges that in many others they contradict it. Consistent endorsement
of the principle in either form would, he supposes, fundamentally alter our world.
For the principle is unconcerned with matters of proximity or distance – whether the
child is ten yards away or thousands of miles away – or whether I alone or millions
could act to prevent the bad thing from occurring. Of course, this indiﬀerence has
obvious implications where the topic is that of world poverty. There may be
psychological reasons why a Westerner may be less inclined to address urgent needs
in Africa than those right on their doorstep – we may feel less guilty about refusing
assistance where we will not see the eﬀects of this in person, or where others
habitually make similar refusals. But these reasons do not have a moral basis.10 In
6 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. J. H. Burns and H.
L. A. Hart (London: Athlone, 1970), ch. I, sec. 2, p. 12.
7 Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. John Bowring (Edinburgh: Tait, 1843), vol. II,
p. 537; see also David Lyons, In the Interest of the Governed (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1973), pp. 102–5.
8 Peter Singer, ‘Famine, Aﬄuence, and Morality’, Philosophy and Public Aﬀairs, 1 (1972), pp. 229–43;
see also Singer, Practical Ethics, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), ch. 8.
9 Singer, ‘Famine, Aﬄuence, and Morality’, p. 231, my emphasis.
10 See Richard J. Arneson, ‘Do Patriotic Ties Limit Global Justice Duties?’, Journal of Ethics, 9
(2005), pp. 127–50.
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consequence, Singer suggests that ‘[t]he traditional distinction between duty and
charity cannot be drawn, or at least, not in the place we usually draw it’.11
Non-governmental organisations providing the means for relatively rich individuals
to help the global poor are referred to as ‘charities’; while it may be thought good
when an individual contributes, it is not thought bad when she does not. But new
clothes, say, are not morally significant, whereas saving a life is. Hence, spending the
money on the latter rather than the former is required by morality; the contrary
action is morally wrong.
The argument is framed in terms that Singer hopes will appeal to utilitarians and
non-utilitarians alike. The appeal to non-utilitarians is based on the weak version of
the prevention principle, on which ‘it may not follow that we ought to reduce
ourselves to the level of marginal utility, for one might hold that to reduce oneself
and one’s family to this level is to cause something significantly bad to happen’. Even
the weaker version has radical implications, he believes: ‘it should be clear that we
would have to give away enough to ensure that the consumer society, dependent as
it is on people spending on trivia rather than giving to famine relief, would slow down
and perhaps disappear entirely’.12 I am sceptical about this. There is no prima facie
reason for holding the ‘trivia’ of consumer society to be morally insignificant. That
a Western child is happy for even a few days seems to me to be morally significant;
since that happiness may be based on being the recipient of a particular favoured toy,
the provision of that toy may itself be morally significant. Many adults have their
own consumerist sources of happiness (however short-lived), and these sources also
take on moral significance. And once this is accepted, one who endorses the weak
version of the prevention principle can simply observe that aiding the global poor will
almost always have some morally significant opportunity cost.
Of course, the moral significance in such cases pales in comparison to, say, the
moral significance of a child being well-fed rather than starving. To introduce this
comparison of moral significance, and favour that course of action which realises the
more significant moral goods, is to endorse the stronger version of the prevention
principle. This need not be accompanied by full-blown utilitarianism – one might, for
instance, hold that rights of various utility-trumping kinds exist. But since such rights
might be filled out in such a way that, say, one is permitted to spend one’s money
exactly as one wishes, the utilitarian route to the kind of conclusion Singer wants to
reach appears to be surer than most. There is an important reason for this.
Diminishing marginal returns – the fact that, in general, £1 creates more utility in the
hands of a poor person than it does in the hands of a rich person – provides a
utilitarian reason for distributing money in egalitarian fashion.13 This is even
stronger as a reason for transdomestic redistribution than it is as a reason for
domestic redistribution. A pound or a dollar can buy much more in a developing
country than it can in a developed one. This is likely to more than oﬀset the eﬀect of
lower expectations among the poor in generally poor countries, although that is also
an important empirical factor to be taken into account.
Utilitarianism is a comprehensive moral theory – it prescribes action for both
individuals and governments. In recent formulations it is cosmopolitan, in that the
11 Singer, ‘Famine, Aﬄuence, and Morality’, p. 235.
12 Ibid., p. 241.
13 Peter Singer, ‘The Right to be Rich or Poor’, in Jeﬀrey Paul (ed.), Reading Nozick (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1982), p. 50.
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basic unit of moral concern is the individual. Despite utilitarianism’s bad reputation,
I think it is clear what it has to say on the topic of world poverty: aﬄuent individuals
must alleviate it as a matter of morality; aﬄuent governments must alleviate it as a
matter of social justice.14 Nevertheless, I do not think it is an ideal basis on which to
apply the strong prevention principle, since I believe that at least two things other
than total or average utility matter, morally speaking. One of these is central to the
most prominent account of distributive justice to have emerged in the twentieth
century. It is to this account that I now turn.
Rawlsian justice
In 1971 Rawls published A Theory of Justice,15 and political philosophy would never
be the same again. Rawls argued for a modernised version of the social contract
theory of Locke, Rousseau and Kant, dispensing with a quasi-historical state of
nature, and putting in its stead an explicitly ahistorical ‘original position’, from which
a group of persons are to decide on the principles by which the main institutions of
their society are be organised. The original position incorporates a ‘veil of ignorance’,
to the eﬀect that those choosing the principles do not know their own place in the
resulting distribution. Rawls further argues that, facing such a profound, one-oﬀ
choice, the choosers would settle on principles that, firstly secure basic liberties
(political liberty, property rights, freedom from physical and psychological assault,
and freedoms of speech, assembly, conscience, thought); secondly ensure ‘fair
equality of opportunity’ (that each has the same chance to acquire each position,
except where an opportunity inequality improves the opportunities of those with
lesser opportunities); and thirdly, guarantee the greatest benefit for the least
advantaged (the worst-oﬀ are to hold as much income and wealth as possible,
consistent with basic liberties, fair equality of opportunity and obligations to future
generations). The overall account, which Rawls calls ‘justice as fairness’, describes
a distribution of rights, liberties, self-respect, opportunities, income, and wealth –
collectively, ‘social primary goods’ – that is to the advantage of the worst oﬀ.
The principles Rawls endorses seem on the face of it to provide much support for
world poverty alleviation. Most obviously, the ‘diﬀerence principle’, which ensures
that the income and wealth of the worst oﬀ are maximised, might seem to provide the
basis for a very direct argument for improving the economic standing of the global
poor. The basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity are ‘lexically prior’
to – roughly, trumping of – the diﬀerence principle, but these too seem to support
substantial assistance to the globally worst oﬀ. Clearly, many people in the
14 Singer himself would maybe be uncomfortable with describing this as a concern of justice, and
Brian Barry has suggested that his utilitarianism is really concerned with the contrasting notion of
‘humanity’. See Singer, Practical Ethics, pp. 14–15; Barry, ‘Humanity and Justice in Global
Perspective’, in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (eds), Nomos XXIV: Ethics, Economics,
and the Law (New York: New York University Press, 1982). But others make it clear that
utilitarianism gives a central role to distributive justice. See, for instance J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism in
his On Liberty and Other Essays, ed. John Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), ch. V; R.
M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), ch. 9; P. J. Kelly, Utilitarianism
and Distributive Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
15 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); references to
revised edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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developing world do not have the right to vote or the freedom to publicly criticise
their rulers, and it is manifest both that these persons are denied access to many kinds
of jobs found in prosperous countries, and that this denial does not improve the
opportunities of the denied. Overthrowing these prevailing political and occupational
circumstances is in practice very much tied up with improving the material condition
of the poor. Even if this is not strictly speaking a precondition of equal access to the
democratic process and the job market, it is clearly no impediment to it, and hence
appears to be mandated by one and consistent with the other two of the demands of
Rawlsian justice.
But Rawls’ masterpiece also presents some obvious obstacles to global poverty
alleviation. A Theory of Justice explicitly states that the theory is only to be applied
within a society. Furthermore, in those few places where the book oﬀers some
tangential discussion of transdomestic justice, it is characterised as a question of ‘the
justice of the law of nations and of relations between states’.16 Hence, in a discussion
occasioned by his analysis of conscription and conscientious refusal, Rawls suggests
that ‘one may extend the interpretation of the original position and think of the
parties as representatives of diﬀerent nations who must choose together the
fundamental principles to adjudicate conflicting claims among states’.17 He com-
ments that this procedure is ‘fair among nations’, and that there would be ‘no
surprises’ in the outcome, ‘since the principles chosen would . . . be familiar ones’
ensuring treaty compliance, describing the conditions for just wars, and granting
rights of self-defence and self-determination – the latter being ‘a right of a people to
settle its own aﬀairs without the intervention of foreign powers’.18 This is, then, a
thoroughly nationalist conception of justice: social justice applies only within a state
or nation. Rawls’s radical principles of distributive justice, such as the diﬀerence
principle, would only hold transdomestically where, improbably, states had signed
treaties to this eﬀect. Given that such wide ranging internationally redistributive
treaties have never been signed, A Theory of Justice provided a rationale for the
Western general public’s impression that their duties to the global poor are, at most,
those of charity.
Rawls’ full expression of his views in this area came nearly three decades later in
The Law of Peoples.19 Here Rawls again uses the notion of a transdomestic original
position, arguing that it is an appropriate instrument for selecting laws to govern
relations between both liberal societies and ‘decent non-liberal societies’, especially
those which are ‘decent hierarchical societies’, being non-aggressive, recognising their
citizens’ human rights, assigning widely acknowledged additional rights and duties,
and being backed by genuine and not unreasonable beliefs among judges and other
oﬃcials that the law embodies a ‘common good idea of justice’.20 This Society of
Peoples would agree to be guided by eight principles constituting ‘the basic charter of
the Law of Peoples’.21
Rawls is quite clear that the Society of Peoples would not even be allowed to
consider general distributive principles such as those he advocated at the domestic
16 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 7.
17 Ibid., p. 331.
18 Ibid., p. 332.
19 Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
20 Ibid., pp. 64–7.
21 Ibid., p. 37.
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level in A Theory of Justice: the only question is how the parties choose to interpret
the eight principles. Rawls oﬀers little overt argument for this conclusion, but it is
worth briefly considering two diﬀerences he says hold between the domestic and
transdomestic cases which may seem to yield some such arguments. First, Rawls
notes this diﬀerence between the two uses of the original position:
A people of a constitutional democracy has, as a liberal people, no comprehensive doctrine
of the good . . ., whereas individuals within a liberal democratic society do have such
conceptions, and to deal with their needs as citizens, the idea of primary goods is used.22
By a comprehensive doctrine of the good, Rawls means a thoroughgoing religious or
philosophical account of value and virtue in human life.23 Primary goods provide the
means by which each individual can pursue whichever conception of the good life they
endorse. Since a liberal people is characterised by ‘reasonable pluralism’, it does not
itself endorse any comprehensive doctrine, and hence, Rawls implies, primary goods
considerations are less weighty. But I do not think this at all follows. While a liberal
people does indeed have no interest in promoting any particular comprehensive
doctrine, it surely has an interest in securing primary goods, which are the means by
which any reasonable comprehensive doctrine can be pursued. It is therefore unclear
why a liberal people’s representative in the transdomestic original position would not
apply precisely the same reasoning as in the domestic original position, and secure a
package of primary goods that is favourable to the worst oﬀ nations, just in case, once
the veil of ignorance is lifted, it turns out she represents one of those nations.
Rawls notes a second diﬀerence in examining the eight principles:
Much as in examining the distributive principles in justice as fairness, we begin with the
baseline of equality – in the case of justice as fairness the equality of social and economic
primary goods, in this case the equality of and the equal rights of all peoples. In the first
case we asked whether any departure from the baseline of equality would be agreed to
provided that it is to the benefit of all citizens of society and, in particular, the least
advantaged. . . . With the Law of Peoples, however, persons are under not one but many
governments, and the representatives of peoples will want to preserve the equality and
independence of their own society.24
This draws on what Rawls calls the ‘fundamental interests of peoples’, which extend
to the protection of their territory, security, political independence, culture of
freedom, self-respect, as well as their citizens’ well-being.25 But the starkness of the
contrast Rawls’ draws between the domestic and transdomestic case relies on
omitting the last of these fundamental interests – that of citizens’ well-being. If such
interests are omitted, justice as fairness-style distributive principles no longer have
much traction, since the primary goods they distribute take much of their significance
from the extent to which they promote various aspects of individual well-being. But
how might this omission be justified?
In the first place, it might be supposed that some other interests – roughly, those
concerned with one or other form of a people’s self-determination – take precedence.
But even if we accept this, it would still not follow that well-being should drop out
of the picture altogether. Once self-determination has been secured, diﬀerent
22 Ibid., p. 40, original emphasis.
23 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
24 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 41.
25 Ibid., p. 34.
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interactions between peoples will have diﬀerent impacts on well-being. So it does not
follow that we should disregard well-being on account of the importance of
self-determination, since both kinds of fundamental interest may be simultaneously
promoted.
Rawls hints at another ground for downplaying the importance of well-being. He
says that ‘[i]t is part of a people’s being reasonable and rational that they are ready
to oﬀer to other peoples fair terms of political and social cooperation’, and that
‘[t]hese fair terms are those that a people sincerely believes other equal peoples might
accept also’.26 It is not clear what Rawls thinks the relevant kind of acceptance here
actually is. It might be the acceptance of the other peoples’ representatives in the
transdomestic original position. But there is no reason for thinking that such
representatives would be unconcerned with well-being – far from it. One way they
might express their concern would be to endorse justice as fairness. For the argument
from acceptability to support the exclusion of well-being considerations, the intended
acceptability must then be real-world. It can well be imagined that, in a real world
Society of Peoples, substantial proposals to promote well-being in transdomestic
fashion would be unacceptable to many peoples. For example, wealthy peoples
would typically lose out under justice as fairness, and they would therefore propose
less demanding inter-people redistribution, or no such redistribution at all. But it is
hard to see these realist considerations shouldering the kind of moral weight Rawls
would require. Reasonableness and fairness are not decided by what rich countries
are likely to oﬀer to poorer ones.
But let us see where Rawls’ sharp distinction between domestic and transdomestic
justice lead us. What of the eight principles of the Law of Peoples that Rawls does say
are acceptable? Of these, the sixth, which ensures that human rights are honoured,
has some distributive potential. Although Rawls construes human rights quite
narrowly, focusing on basic liberties and formal equality rather than socioeconomic
rights, he does at least accept a right to life, including a right to subsidence.27 Rawls
does not mention any rights to standards of living above bare subsistence, and shies
away from stating that peoples have a general duty to uphold the right to subsistence.
The only relevant duty appears to be that described by the eighth principle,
describing a highly circumscribed duty of assistance. Rawls acknowledges that some
regimes cannot qualify as ‘well-ordered’, being neither liberal nor decent. Some of
these are expansive outlaw states, but others are non-aggressive burdened societies.
Well-ordered peoples have the long-term objective of making these regimes well-
ordered. In the case of burdened societies, well-ordered peoples are under a duty to
assist such states in their eﬀorts at overcoming the political, cultural, economic and
technological barriers before them. But Rawls believes that principles of distributive
justice are not necessarily required here, since ‘[m]ost such principles do not have a
defined goal, aim, or cut-oﬀ point, beyond which aid may cease’.28 Instead, he
advocates a ‘duty of assistance’, which appears to be quite distinct from duties of
social justice. Furthermore, once a well-ordered society has been brought about,
Rawls insists that any assistance be cut oﬀ, however poor that society may remain.
In short, from what Rawls says, it does not appear that the global poor have any
26 Ibid., p. 35.
27 Ibid., p. 65.
28 Ibid., p. 106.
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claim of justice on the citizens and governments of aﬄuent countries. Those below
the subsistence level may have a claim for assistance, but it is not clear where the
corresponding duty lies. Those just above the subsistence level have no claim
whatsoever where their society is liberal or decent. Rawls’ systematic treatment of
transdomestic justice give much the same impression as the scattered comments in A
Theory of Justice: justice does not oblige the global rich to alleviate world poverty.
However, we saw earlier that Rawls fails to explain why the transdomestic original
position would decide on principles so radically diﬀerent from those of the domestic
original position. No good reason has been given for why the representatives in the
first instance, unlike those in the second, would refuse to agree on principles whose
justification and principal eﬀect is the channelling of primary goods to the disadvan-
taged. It follows that one might develop a Rawlsian account of justice that endorses
full-blown principles of distributive justice at both the domestic and transdomestic
levels. An international diﬀerence principle, for example, would be able to appeal to
much the same considerations as the original, domestic one. If it seems morally
arbitrary that some individuals are advantaged, and some disadvantaged, by their
endowments of natural, social and economic resources, as Rawls argues, it may also
be thought the case that a similar moral arbitrariness applies where one people is
advantaged over another through similar chance circumstances. This moral arbitrari-
ness makes international inequalities in income and wealth appropriate only where
they benefit the least advantaged, as the diﬀerence principle allows. We would
redistribute from rich countries to poor countries in the name of justice, and the
redistribution takes place even where the receiving country is well-ordered.
This is not the only way that Rawlsian justice can be extended beyond the
domestic. Charles Beitz argues that, since there is in fact a global system of
cooperation, it is appropriate to apply principles of distributive justice at this level.29
Rather than being concerned with the principles which representatives of diﬀerent
peoples would agree on in the original position, we should be concerned with the
principles that each individual in the world would agree on. On this basis, he suggests
that Rawls should in fact endorse a cosmopolitan diﬀerence principle.30 This account
of justice demands even greater redistribution, this time from rich individuals to poor
individuals. It seems to have support beyond that available to the international
diﬀerence principle, in being an obvious application of Rawls’ methodological
individualism.31 I will not here oﬀer further grounds for choosing between the
international and cosmopolitan approaches to Rawlsian distributive justice. It
suﬃces to observe that either oﬀers a far more consistent extension of Rawlsian
justice in a transdomestic direction. Neither places artificial nationalist or realist
restrictions on the kinds of principles that representative persons in the original
position can choose. Both demand that whatever can be done to help the global poor
is done.
29 Rawls’ (implicit) view that there is no such international co-operation is supported in Barry,
‘Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective’, pp. 232–3.
30 Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1979).
31 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 233–4; Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1989), p. 247. For the more general claim that the usual justifications of
distributive justice principles imply cosmopolitan versions of such principles, see Caney, Justice
Beyond Borders, ch. 4.
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Responsibility
Rawls in fact objects to extending the diﬀerence principle in the ways I have
suggested by means of two counterexamples. In the first, one liberal or decent
country industrialises and a second deliberately does not, preferring the pastoral,
leisurely status quo. The former country thereby becomes much the wealthier of the
two. In the second counterexample, one liberal or decent country brings its high
population growth under control, while a second chooses not to. In both cases, the
diﬀerential outcomes can be explained by freely held social values. Rawls notes that
a diﬀerence principle would have the eﬀect of taxing the first of each pair of countries,
in order to improve the position of the second. But he asserts that this does not seem
right, and that his duty of assistance, which would not apply in cases such as this
where all the countries involved are liberal or decent, therefore seems preferable.32
I am not quite sure why Rawls’ thinks this application of the diﬀerence principle
seems wrong since he oﬀers little by way of explanation. But I am inclined to agree
with him, and I think many others are as well. There are various possible grounds for
this, but they all concern responsibility.33 These are not considerations of a sort that
can be drawn from Rawls’ theory of domestic justice, since responsibility in fact plays
little role in it. I believe that this is a deficiency of Rawls’ domestic theory, and hence
of any account of transdomestic justice that is drawn from it – be it the ‘oﬃcial’ Law
of Peoples, or the alternative accounts I recommended as truer to Rawls’ overall
position.
The point can be illustrated by looking at how the duty of assistance would
operate in a slight variation of the first of the scenarios just depicted. Here one
burdened society industrialises and a second deliberately does not, and the former
thereby becomes much the wealthier of the two. With the culmination of indus-
trialisation, this first country also becomes liberal or decent. At this point, if we apply
the duty of assistance, the first, newly industrial society is obligated to provide
assistance to the second, wilfully pastoral society as before. But this time the
justification is in terms of facilitating the development of the second into a
well-ordered society.
One objection to this new counterexample should be addressed immediately. It
might be supposed that it makes all the diﬀerence that in the original counterexample
both societies were well-ordered at the point when the important decisions were being
made, whereas in this scenario neither society is well-ordered. I do not see how this
undermines the force of the counterexample. That one country is well-ordered and
another is not may mean nothing more than that one is non-aggressive, recognises its
citizens’ human rights, assigns widely acknowledged additional rights and duties, and
is backed by genuine and not unreasonable beliefs among judges and other oﬃcials
that the law embodies a common good idea of justice, and that the other exhibits all
32 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, pp. 117–18. Rawls seems to assume that Beitz is concerned with
distributions between nations or peoples, when in fact, being a cosmopolitan, he is concerned only
with individuals. This makes little diﬀerence to the force of the counterexamples, since the members
of each group are treated as acting as one, and hence unfairly advantaging or disadvantaging one
group coincides with unfairly advantaging or disadvantaging all of its members.
33 David Miller, who criticises Beitz on similar grounds, is more explicit here: ‘To respect the
autonomy of other nations also involves treating them as responsible for decisions they make about
resource use, economic growth, environmental protection, and so forth’ (On Nationality (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1995)), p. 108.
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of these attributes but one. The citizens of burdened societies may play as great – or
an even greater – role as citizens in decent societies in making decisions about
industrialisation. The decision may be one they share in the appropriate sense, and it
may fully reflect their freely held social values relating to the issue in hand. The fact
that they may simultaneously be denied input into some decisions does not diminish
their responsibility for the decisions that they are involved in.
While Rawls is right that a transdomestically applied diﬀerence principle is
inappropriate, the same is true of his alternative. But how might transdomestic
theory better capture the relevant distinctions, and particularly, those concerning
responsibility? One answer here is provided by Thomas Pogge, who has recently
forcefully argued that negative duties would play a central role in a plausible account
of global justice. Pogge ‘propose[s] to call negative any duty to ensure that others are
not unduly harmed (or wronged) through one’s own conduct and to call positive the
remainder: any duty to benefit persons or to shield them from other harms’.34 He
believes, firstly, that so defined, negative duties are weightier than positive duties, and
secondly, that world poverty alleviation is, for the aﬄuent, a matter of negative duty.
Let us take these claims in turn.
The strength of the focus on negative duties is apparently demonstrated where we
apply it to the scenario presented as a counterexample to Rawlsian transdomestic
justice. In this case it can be assumed that the industrialised country has not imposed
harms, far less undue harms, on the non-industrialised country. There is therefore no
negative duty in play. By contrast, where the industrialisation occurred at the expense
of the non-industrialised country – perhaps it was exploited in trade negotiations by
the industrialising country, or is subject to its pollution – there appears to be a
negative duty. In this way, Pogge’s account appears to be sensitive to the considera-
tions of responsibility that Rawlsian accounts are not. Roughly, it states that those
who are responsible for another’s unfair disadvantage are strictly obligated to combat
that disadvantage. Any duties in the absence of such responsibility are of the weaker
positive variety.
How, then, does Pogge think the distinction, in combination with the facts of the
world, yields the result that the developed world must help the developing world? He
first attempts to find an ethical baseline, such that those forced below the baseline are
unduly harmed, and settles on a particular construal of the Lockean state of nature.35
The baseline is to be measured by ‘the best lives that can be lived in a state of nature’,
which while lacking modern conveniences, include access to clean water, regular
food, and climate-appropriate clothes and shelter.36 The argument then deploys what
Pogge calls a ‘second-order Lockean proviso’, which states that ‘human beings may
create and enforce economic institutions that permit disproportionate unilateral
appropriation – provided everyone rationally consents to (that is gains from) their
introduction’.37 Since for the global poor there is no gain from the move from the
Lockean state of nature, but only loss, substantial undue harm is being inflicted on
them on a daily basis.
34 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, p. 130.
35 See John Locke, Second Treatise in his Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1960).
36 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, p. 138.
37 Ibid., p. 137 original emphasis.
A pluralistic approach to global poverty 723
I am somewhat sceptical about the Lockean turn of Pogge’s position. I am
unconvinced that significant moral weight should be assigned to comparisons with a
hypothetical Lockean state of nature. Furthermore, I find the kind of comparison
that Pogge uses, and his argument in support of it, particularly problematic.38
Why should one compare the status of the modern day worst-oﬀ with the best-oﬀ in
the state of nature? Pogge seems to oﬀer only one argument for this unusual
comparison:39
if we tell slaves or English day labourers or the present global poor that they could have
rationally agreed ex ante (in ignorance of their social position at birth) to institutions under
which some may be worse oﬀ than persons in a state of nature, they can plausibly reply
that this hypothetical consent cannot have been theirs, since they never had a real chance to
occupy the better positions.40
To be sure, the hypothetical consent never was literally that of these disadvantaged
groups – it is hypothetical consent, after all. While the reply is in fact more than
plausible, it also misses the point. The relevant question, according to the second-
order Lockean proviso that Pogge endorses, is whether the hypothetical consent
could be rational. It seems to me not only that it could be, but that it must be. It
seems absurd to suggest that, given the choice between a global state of nature where,
in absolute terms, a small minority are averagely oﬀ and the overwhelming majority
are badly oﬀ, and a global society of sorts where half are well oﬀ, and half are badly
oﬀ, a person deprived of information about their position would choose the former
option. Such a radical position goes beyond even Rawls’ highly controversial
conception of rationality in similar circumstances as involving ‘maximining’, or
maximising the minimum (worst) outcome.41 For in the present case, the state of
nature does not oﬀer any improvement in the position of the worst oﬀ. Choosing it
would simply increase the likelihood that the chooser was in a worse oﬀ position, and
decrease the benefit to be had from being in a better oﬀ position. The alternative
choice is rational from the perspective of any major decision rule.
This all matters because the circumstances of the state of nature’s best oﬀ are, by
definition, not representative. When we compare the present day global poor’s
standing with that of the averagely well oﬀ in the start of nature, it is far from obvious
that the former are being harmed by the existing global order, since there is no
guarantee whatsoever that the average person in the state of nature would have his
basic needs met. If the comparison is with the worst oﬀ in the state of nature, which
it arguably should be, it is even harder to identify real world harm. In short, a
38 This problematic aspect of Pogge’s position is not found in other modern ‘left-libertarian’ writers,
although they share the more general insistence on the moral weightiness of comparisons with the
state of nature; see Hillel Steiner, An Essay on Rights (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994) and Michael
Otsuka, Libertarianism without Inequality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
39 That is, aside from his equally unusual interpretation of Locke’s comment that ‘a King of a large
fruitful territory (in the Americas) feeds, lodges, and is clad far worse than a day Laborer in
England’ (Second Treatise, sec. 41, p. 297) as supporting the worst-oﬀ-to-best-oﬀ comparison. In
fact, Locke’s point here is intended purely factually: he is merely illustrating the point of his
previous paragraph that ‘if we will rightly estimate things as they come to our use, and cast up the
several Expences about them, what in them is purely owing to Nature, and what to labour, we shall
find, that in most of them 99/100 are wholly to be put on the account of labour’.
40 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, p. 138, original emphasis.
41 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 132–5; see John C. Harsanyi, ‘Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a
Basis for Morality?’, American Political Science Review, 64 (1975), pp. 594–606.
724 Carl Knight
Lockean baseline can only be a sure way of identifying undue harm where its
mechanism is rigged in most counterintuitive fashion.
There is an additional problem here. If, in spite of its obvious problems, we accept
Pogge’s Lockean baseline, or alternatively accept some other way of distinguishing
undue harm,42 it seems obvious that some groups, such as rich and powerful
governments, multinational corporations, and international organisations, have
unduly harmed the global poor, and therefore have negative duties to alleviate world
poverty. But the duties of individuals remain far from clear. Pogge claims that ‘[b]y
continuing to support the current global order and the national policies that shape
and sustain it without taking compensating actions toward institutional reform or
shielding its victims, we share a negative responsibility for the undue harms they
forseeably produce’.43 But this relies on a highly controversial conception of
responsibility. A typical Western individual can exert little or no influence on her
country’s policy decisions, far less on the global order.44 Very often she will not even
be contributing to her country’s prosperity: it may be that, were she to resign from
her post, another currently unemployed or underemployed person would be suﬃ-
ciently productive that there would be a net societal gain from this resignation. An
individual who has no control over an outcome, whether it be the political decisions
of a country or its economic power, can plausibly deny responsibility for it. A focus
on negative duties may in fact appear to absolve many averagely powerful Western
individuals from any responsibility to combat world poverty.
Even accepting Pogge’s unusual account of responsibility does not easily lead us
to negative duties for aﬄuent individuals. Since the vehicle for undue harming is
society, construed in a broad way, one can avoid the acquisition of negative duties
simply by cutting oneself oﬀ from society. On this account it may then follow, as
Pogge suggests, that ‘I might honor my negative duties . . . through becoming a
hermit or an emigrant’.45 This is surely absurd. Faced with the fact that hundreds of
millions of our fellow human beings are in the direst of circumstances, Pogge oﬀers
complete withdrawal from the world as a way of meeting the most pressing moral
obligations we are under – as, in principle, just as good a way of meeting these
obligations as actually doing something about the miserable conditions many face.
This shows, as clearly as anything, that placing such weight on negative duties
over-emphasises the significance of agent guilt at the expense of what really
matters – making the world a better place.
42 Independently of his Lockean baseline argument, Pogge suggests these definitions: ‘we are harming
the global poor if and insofar as we collaborate in imposing an unjust global institutional order on
them. And this institutional order is definitely unjust if and insofar as it foreseeably perpetuates
large-scale human rights deficits that would be reasonably avoidable through feasible institutional
modifications’ (Thomas Pogge, ‘World Poverty and Human Rights’, Ethics and International Aﬀairs,
19 (2005), pp. 1–7, p. 5, original emphasis). Given the context, Pogge is most likely defining undue
harm. But note that for this definition and that of the unjust global order to be at all determinate
some prior definition of human rights is needed. Other ways of identifying undue harm may then be
just as circuitous (and possibly contentious) as the Lockean baseline route.
43 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, p. 144; see also Thomas Pogge, ‘On the Site of
Distributive Justice’, pp. 166–7.
44 See Deborah Satz, ‘What Do We Owe the Global Poor?’, Ethics and International Aﬀairs, 19 (2005),
pp. 47–54.
45 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, p. 66; see also Pogge, ‘On the Site of Distributive Justice’,
p. 168.
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Pogge is not in fact committed to the view that negative duties are all that matter.46
He can acknowledge that positive duties remain in play, even when negative duties
fail to materialise, or are met through a deliberate policy of personal isolationism.
But Pogge certainly downplays the importance of such positive duties.47 Consider,
for example, this comparison:
There are two ways of conceiving [global] poverty as a moral challenge to us: we may be
failing our positive duty to help persons in acute distress; and we may be failing to fulfil our
more stringent negative duty not to uphold injustice, not to contribute to or profit from the
unjust impoverishment of others.48
Taken together with a more nuanced account of individual responsibility than that
Pogge entertains, this is an argument for only the weakest of duties regarding world
poverty for many aﬄuent individuals. Pogge never fully explains the relationship
between the two kinds of duty, or defines relative weights. But what he does say
would be quite consistent with placing absolute or lexical priority on negative duties.
It may well be better on Pogge’s account to isolate oneself from the world than to do
one’s utmost to address needless suﬀering in the developing world, since the former
may fully satisfy negative duties in a way the latter does not.
I believe there is a much better way of incorporating responsibility considerations
into our account of global distributive justice. Rather than focus on the positive/
negative duty distinction, we concern ourselves with the distinction between those
advantages and disadvantages which individuals are responsible for, and those
advantages and disadvantages which individuals are not responsible for. This latter
distinction has been central to many post-Rawlsian debates about egalitarian justice,
and has yielded many insights.49 Particular weight is given to the distinction by luck
egalitarianism, according to which variations in advantage levels are justifiable
insofar as they reflect diﬀerential exercises of responsibility. I now want to show how
luck egalitarianism might be applied to the topic of world poverty.
First, I consider application to the case which initially drew our attention to
responsibility considerations, and which seemed to support the significance of
negative duties. Here, it will be recalled, there is inequality of holdings as a result of
one society industrialising and another freely declining this option. An important
thing to notice about the kind of luck egalitarianism that I am putting forward here
is that it does not look at the societies as a whole in nationalistic fashion, but rather
takes a cosmopolitan perspective, looking at the responsible acts of each individual.
On the face of it, it seems likely that the inter-societal inequality roughly corresponds
to the actions of the individuals who make up each society involved: after all, it is
specified that the choices of the two societies reflect their social values. If these values,
and the corresponding actions, are universally held and performed within each
society, there seems to be no evident injustice in the first society holding on to its
46 Thomas Pogge, ‘Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duty’, Ethics and International Aﬀairs,
19 (2005), pp. 55–83, pp. 65–9.
47 See Rowan Cruft, ‘Human Rights and Positive Duties’, Ethics and International Aﬀairs, 19 (2005),
pp. 29–37.
48 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, p. 197, original emphasis.
49 Richard J. Arneson, ‘Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare’, Philosophical Studies, 56 (1989),
pp. 77–93; G. A. Cohen, ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice’, Ethics, 99 (1989), pp. 906–44;
Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), ch. 2.
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material advantage over the second.50 If they are less than universally held and
performed, it seems appropriate for some redistribution from less responsible to more
responsible individuals to take place, regardless of which society they belong to. I
submit that this response to the case is at least as intuitively plausible as that Pogge
suggests.
How, then, does one apply luck egalitarianism to the world as it actually is? The
luck egalitarian does not ask, ‘are the global poor doing better than they would do
in a Lockean state of nature?’, or any other such hypothetical question. Rather, it
asks whether the diﬀerential advantages so manifest in our world reflect diﬀerential
exercises of responsibility. It is conceptually possible for a highly advantaged group
to act so much more responsibly than a highly disadvantaged group that the
inequality between them is justified. But this is not at all what the world is like. The
global rich and poor did not start with equal resources, which one group deployed
diligently, and the other wasted on gambles and consumption. Rather, the present
day rich started with much more than the present day poor. Many of the poor are
children, for whom judgments of responsibility are usually thought inappropriate. In
such cases, where there is no responsibility, there should be no disadvantage. The
adult poor have not, typically, acted unusually irresponsibly. Often living some sort
of life for as long as they have required substantial eﬀorts and prudent decision-
making. At any rate, there are no grounds at all for thinking that their puny
distributive shares, and the relatively huge holdings of even an averagely positioned
Westerner, are at all proportional to diﬀerential exercises of responsibility. In short,
the existing distribution is grossly unjust. Luck egalitarianism demands that aﬄuent
governments redistribute assets to the global poor on a massive scale.
What, though, of the duties of individuals? Like Rawlsian justice, of which it is a
development, luck egalitarianism was conceived as an account of distributive justice,
typically to be applied to the ‘basic structure’ of societies. I believe, however, that
there is no special problem in applying it to individual action. Of course, individuals
can generally do much less than governments to reduce global poverty, but they can
still do something, in terms of both directly contributing and, where viable, taking
political action to exert pressure on government policy. Furthermore, ‘ethical luck
egalitarianism’, as we might name the version that speaks to personal morality, can
generate individual duties without requiring that those individuals are actually
responsible for the undue harms of which the global poor are victims. Luck
egalitarianism assigns the duties to right the great moral wrong of world poverty to,
first, those who are responsible for this wrong, and second, where no one is
responsible for the wrong, or where the wrongdoers will not right it, to those who are
not responsible for the wrong, but whose holdings are not as small, relative to their
responsibility, as those of the victims of the wrong. Hence, if it turns out, as it appears
50 Two complications should be noted here. First, in my view, and that of luck egalitarians such as
Richard Arneson, the appropriate measure of advantage is welfare, and hence we can only really
judge the fairness of distributions of holdings (and of other goods, such as leisure time, which the
second society may have an advantage in) once their welfare eﬀects are known. In the text I simplify
by assuming that something like holdings is a decent proxy. Second, I say evident injustice, since
there may be an injustice where individuals are not responsible for their actions, in spite of (or
because of) the fact they are based on universally held social values. Again, for illustrative purposes,
I simplify by assuming that such acts are responsible ones. Luck egalitarianism actually makes no
such assumption. See Carl Knight, ‘The Metaphysical Case For Luck Egalitarianism’, Social Theory
and Practice, 32 (2006), pp. 173–89.
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to, that very many aﬄuent individuals are not responsible for how their governments
enforce world poverty, luck egalitarianism can still insist that they do something
about it if responsibility for the wrong lies with nature, with the dead, with those
unable to right their wrongs, or with those who refuse to act according to their duties.
Since it does not rely on negative duties, ethical luck egalitarianism does not let
rich individuals disregard poverty for which they are not responsible. It also does not
allow such individuals to limit their duties by detaching themselves from society,
since duties are generated from the wrongness of unjustified poverty itself, rather
than from aﬄuent countries’ roles in creating such poverty. Taken together with a
sensible account of individual responsibility for the undue harm of poverty, luck
egalitarianism suggests that the most obvious major moral wrong of the world today
is global poverty combined with the victims’ non-responsibility for such poverty.
Responsibility for bringing such undue harm about is relevant, but strict duties to
undo it go far beyond those arising from such responsibility. Luck egalitarianism also
suggests that global poverty alleviation on grounds of responsibility is reliant upon
neither holding members of pluralistic democracies responsible for decisions they had
no hand in, nor personification of humankind as the agent of such poverty.51
A pluralistic approach
In this section I set out an alternative approach to transdomestic distributive justice
and personal ethics, for which I claim two related but distinct advantages. First, it
seems to capture the relevant moral considerations, and no irrelevant considerations.
Second, its pluralistic character ensures that even its partial acceptance results in the
endorsement of world poverty alleviation. This second advantage is, admittedly,
much the less fundamental of the two, but it is still an advantage, especially since
some writers on global poverty have been at pains to inject broad appeal into their
accounts.
In my view, none of the three accounts of distributive justice examined above
adequately captures all that it needs to at either the domestic or transdomestic levels.
Utilitarianism fails to account for the significance of responsibility or of improving
the position of the worst oﬀ; Rawlsian justice, while correcting the second flaw, leaves
the first in place, and also fails to account for the value of improving aggregate
welfare or resource (hereafter: advantage) levels; and luck egalitarianism, while
accounting for responsibility, does not acknowledge the importance of either
aggregate advantage or showing special concern for the worst oﬀ. An obvious
solution presents itself: combine all three approaches in a pluralistic approach to
distributive justice that gives some weight to all three types of considerations. This
view of justice, which we might simply call the pluralistic account, seems about right
to me.52 It also very obviously endorses the conclusion that we need to stop thinking
51 These further two positions are suggested by Alexander Cappelen, ‘Responsibility and International
Distributive Justice’, and Ser-Min Shei, ‘World Poverty and Moral Responsibility’, both in Follesdal
and Pogge (eds), Real World Justice (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005).
52 The pluralistic account does not fully reflect Rawlsian justice since it does not give priority to basic
liberties or fair opportunity, and is welfarist. Note also that the most natural extension of the
pluralistic account to transdomestic cases would also depart from Rawls’ position in being
cosmopolitan. In these and other regards it is very similar to Richard Arneson’s
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about world poverty as an issue of charity, and start thinking about it as a truly
monumental injustice that aﬄuent countries are obligated to right.
Those who wish to reject this approach can take one of two strategies. They
might argue against the inclusion of one or more of the component considerations,
or they might insist that the construct as a whole is somehow less than the sum of
its parts. I will not say very much against the first of these strategies, since the
three considerations have been central to the preceding discussion. It suﬃces here
to note that each consideration has attracted considerable attention and support in
the literature in its own right, and that each of the following views seem, by the
standards of contemporary political philosophy, relatively uncontroversial: that
overall happiness (welfare) levels or the size of the ‘social (resource) pie’ matter;
that diminishing the disadvantages of the worst oﬀ matters; and that those who
act more responsibly (make better choices, make greater eﬀorts, demonstrate
greater prudence, and so on) getting more is, ceteris paribus, better than those who
act less responsibly getting more. I will say a little more about the second strategy,
which can take two forms, both of which focus on the alleged incoherence of the
pluralistic strategy.
The first form suggests that the approach is conceptually incoherent, since it is
pulled in such diﬀerent directions. For instance, it might be suggested that there is an
obvious tension between its utilitarian and luck egalitarian strands, since the first is
future-regarding, and the latter is past-regarding. The contrast with the conceptual
unity of utilitarianism, say, is stark. But I see no reason why we should expect an
account of justice to be tension free. We are often drawn in more than one direction
when considering a problem of justice or of morality more generally, and many have
taken this as a sign that there are several relevant factors in play. Indeed, this has
often been taken as grounds on which to object to utilitarianism as an over-
simplification of the moral realm. Our best guess seems to be that both past action (be
it diligent or reckless) and future eﬀects (whether favourable or unfavourable) are
relevant in deciding how to treat individuals, so the onus is, if anything, on those who
object to pluralism to show why we should not try to accommodate these disparate
considerations.
The second form is manifested in the suggestion that such a pluralistic approach
is practically incoherent. Here the claim is that, even if there is no deep structural
problem with the approach, when it comes to application it suﬀers from internal
conflict or outright indeterminacy. The utilitarian might advocate one course of
action, the Rawlsian another, and the luck egalitarian something else altogether. By
appealing to three considerations, but refusing to assign a lexical order or other
scheme of priority to them, I have, it may be contended, provided a recipe for
disorder.
In reply, it should first be acknowledged that there is indeed some conflict among
the three operative principles. Moreover, there is a certain degree of indeterminacy in
the position as stated above. But this is merely on account of the fact that I have
declined to state specific weightings for the three considerations. Once weightings are
assigned, the only problems of application are the familiar empirical ones. For
‘responsibility-catering prioritarianism’. While Arneson’s account does not focus on advantaging the
worst oﬀ, its focus on the worse oﬀ is closely related. See Richard J. Arneson, ‘Equality of
Opportunity for Welfare Defended and Recanted’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 7 (1999),
pp. 488–97 and ‘Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism’, Ethics, 110 (2000), pp. 339–49.
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example, we might decide that each unit of advantage (welfare or resources, typically)
has a base value of one unit of moral value, that each unit of advantage for the worst
oﬀ is worth an extra unit of moral value, that each unit of advantage for the
responsible is worth an additional half a unit of moral value, and that each unit of
advantage for the irresponsible is worth minus half a unit of moral value. In assessing
public policies, the only question is then which policy realises the greater moral value.
If a first policy brings about ten units of advantage, of which two are in the hands of
the worst oﬀ (who are also responsible and/or irresponsible), six in the hands of the
responsible, and four in the hands of the irresponsible, and a second brings about
twelve units of advantage, of which one is in the hands of the worst oﬀ (who are also
responsible and/or irresponsible), five in the hands of the responsible, and seven in the
hands of the irresponsible, the pluralist approach will choose the first policy, since it
realises thirteen units of moral value, compared to the second policy’s twelve. As this
illustration shows, once a weighting is selected, the component principles do indeed
pull in diﬀerent directions – in this case, Rawlsianism and luck egalitarianism
favoured the first policy, and utilitarianism the second – but there is no problem of
indeterminacy whatsoever. Of course, it is no easy task selecting a specific weighting,
but that does not at all show that the approach is mistaken. In general we do not take
the fact that deciding on the best trade oﬀ is diﬃcult as evidence that some or all of
the things being traded oﬀ are worthless – quite the contrary. Consideration of a
suﬃciently large range of cases may oﬀer further guidance as to the optimum relative
weights of the various considerations. It suﬃces here to note that each consideration
is significant and as such should carry significant weight.
We saw earlier that utilitarianism and ethical luck egalitarianism also suggest that
even quite modestly wealthy individuals are under strict duties of personal ethics to
address the plight of the global poor. Rawlsian justice could, perhaps, be further
extended in this way. G. A. Cohen in fact suggests that, at the domestic level, it is
incoherent to apply Rawlsian justice to the basic structure, but not to individual
choices.53 There may, then, be no great diﬃculty in applying the pluralistic account
to personal ethics. The rationale for this is much the same as that for the
corresponding approach to social justice. In terms of the strong version of Singer’s
prevention principle, we might say that such poverty is a bad which can be prevented
without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, where the comparison
gives weight to the condition of the worst oﬀ and considerations of individual
responsibility in addition to overall utility levels. An individual who favours assigning
weight to just one or two of these factors will nevertheless find global poverty a bad
that needs to be tackled.
Full acceptance of the pluralistic account is not the only way to the conclusion that
world poverty is a very substantial moral wrong, and that rich and powerful
governments must address this as a matter of justice. I have argued that three of the
most prominent accounts of social justice each, when extended to transdomestic
justice in the most appropriate way, yield this conclusion. One who insists that two
of these three positions is utterly irrelevant to justice, but who endorses the third, will
be lead to the above conclusion, as will one who assigns weight to two of the three
positions’ concerns. While it is obvious that the present state of the world is viewed
53 G. A. Cohen, ‘Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice’, Philosophy and Public
Aﬀairs, 26 (1997), pp. 3–30.
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as unjust by those who endorse a human right to subsistence,54 it may have been less
obvious that several more comprehensive accounts of transdomestic distributive
justice also raise such objections. A public policy of removing world poverty would,
perhaps, be unique in being able to draw support from such disparate accounts of
justice. Usually policy decisions take the form suggested by the earlier numerical
example. One policy (a tax decrease, say) is thought to be preferable to another (an
improvement in public services, say) from some important perspectives and inferior
to it from others. No such trade-oﬀs are required in the present case. Even partial
acceptance of the pluralistic account will lead to the objective of global poverty
alleviation.
Several theorists have shown a concern with making this an appealing objective to
those who endorse a wide range of positions. Pogge emphasises that he is ‘trying to
build an argument that is widely acceptable by leaving open whether human rights
entail any positive duties’.55 As indicated earlier, Singer’s argument is intended to
appeal to an even broader range of views. But such theorists have not drawn
attention to the plurality of plausible positions from which world poverty is
criticisable. In consequence, where there appears to be some shortfall in the general
acceptability of the position (as with Singer), or where its implications may be quite
other than those posited (as with Pogge), the entire case unravels. This article has
advanced an approach to transdomestic justice and personal ethics that is pluralistic,
and hence does not stand or fall with any one strand of argument.
In his recent book Justice Beyond Borders, Simon Caney makes a similar claim for
the ‘ecumenical appeal’ of his position. It is appropriate, then, to reflect on the
contrast between the two pluralistic views. This will, I believe, bring out both the
advantages that I claimed for my approach at the start of this section.
Caney tentatively suggests (1) a right of subsistence, (2) global equal opportunity,
(3) equal pay for equal work, and (4) priority to the worse oﬀ.56 I have no criticism
of (4). (1) is, admittedly, fairly uncontroversial, but it also seems somewhat
superfluous, assuming that priority to the worse or (especially) worst oﬀ is given any
substantial weight at all (as I would insist). Furthermore, I do not see (2) or (3) as
having fundamental (non-derivative) moral weight. They are evidently intended in a
very restricted sense, such that exploiting one’s superior native talents is legitimate
grounds for higher remuneration. There are, then, reasons of responsibility to object
to them. It seems, ceteris paribus, unfair to give one person more than another, simply
because they have greater native talent (and hence can use opportunities better, and
get a better job). There is a morally relevant diﬀerence between this case, and that
where the talent has arisen through conscientious, fully responsible eﬀorts, which
luck egalitarianism recognises and Caney does not. I can also conceive of circum-
stances in which it would be just to deny equal pay for equal work (as I take the term
to be meant) on grounds of utility or advantage. If we find that it is harder to attract
certain kinds of specialised, wealth-creating workers to some areas rather than
others, perhaps on grounds of individual preferences for certain climates or social
environments, I see no grounds for objecting to introducing unequal pay for equal
jobs. Sometimes the most socially favourable incentive structure will be unequal in
54 This right is defended in Henry Shue, Basic Rights (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980)
and Charles Jones, Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
55 Pogge, ‘Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duty’, p. 65.
56 Caney, Justice Beyond Borders, pp. 123–4.
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this way. Where equal pay for work leads to localised skill shortfalls, economic
stagnation and, in turn, to a major overall advantage shortfall, its appeal vanishes.
Despite their importance, Caney gives responsibility and utility considerations no
weight at all.
It might be objected that, even if Caney overlooks some things that matter, I seem
to make the same mistake, since I refuse to give equal opportunity and equal pay for
equal work any weight. My reply is that I give these the only kind of weight that is
appropriate to them: derivative or instrumental weight. As it so happens, I believe
that global equal opportunity and equal pay for equal work would make the real
world a more just place, but this is just because these measures would, on balance,
promote utility, improve the circumstances of the worst oﬀ, and reward the more
responsible. The suggested oversight only arises if equal opportunity and/or equal
work for equal pay are sometimes worth pursuing when they do not advance any of
these other goals, which I take to be fundamental. But where they do not advance
those goals they typically reward and penalise on the basis of natural contingency (as
where talents vary but responsibility does not) or procrustean levelling down (as
where equality is secured, but even the worst oﬀ do not gain). The particular
pluralistic approach I have put forward is insensitive to these morally irrelevant
factors.
Although I reject the specifics of Caney’s position, I am sympathetic to his overall
strategy. The pluralistic account alone appears to hold the first advantage of taking
only relevant moral considerations into account, but both this and other plausible
pluralistic approaches hold the second advantage. The fact that Caney’s position
would still endorse the moral and political objective of global poverty alleviation
were it stripped of its two more controversial principles illustrates the robustness of
pluralistic approaches to this topic.
Before I conclude, some remarks on implementation are probably in order.
According to the OECD, in 2005 the United Kingdom was the only large country
with a developed economy to contribute more than 0.5 per cent of its gross domestic
income in oﬃcial development assistance; Italy, Japan, and the United States failed
to contribute even 0.3 per cent.57 The pluralistic account is not, as matter of principle,
committed to the view that rich countries should increase their levels of overseas
development aid. But it seems unlikely that such low levels are presently the best way
of achieving the pluralistic account’s goals. Were the rich countries to spend one per
cent of their gross domestic income on aid it seems improbable that their domestic
welfare levels would suﬀer a drop suﬃcient to fully oﬀset the welfare gains to be
anticipated in poor countries, and Rawlsian and luck egalitarian ends would clearly
be served. There is reason, then, both for governments to take these measures and for
individuals to support political parties and other organisations that endorse them.
Individuals should also, as Singer suggests (but not only for the reasons he mentions),
make donations to charities focused on global poverty alleviation.
Of course, this is all assuming that the aid money is not only spent but spent at
least reasonably well. Writers such as Jeﬀrey Sachs suggest that poor countries could
be lifted onto the ladder of development if only oﬃcial development assistance
increased: ‘If the foreign assistance is substantial enough, and lasts long enough, the
capital stock rises suﬃciently to lift households above subsistence. At that point, the
57 〈http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline〉.
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poverty trap is broken’.58 Even critics of major interventions of this sort do not
usually deny that some forms of aid are eﬀective. If, as William Easterly suggests, ‘the
Planners’ global social engineering has failed to help the poor, and it will always so
fail’, we should as individuals indeed become ‘Searchers’, focusing our eﬀorts on
making sure that money reaches the poor by being motivated, accepting responsi-
bility, providing whatever is locally demanded, and so on.59 Governments could, for
instance, shift money away from conditional IMF loans and towards World Bank
grants; they could increase scrutiny of the performance of aid agencies and ‘give more
power and funds to the many Searchers who are already working in development’.60
More money means more can get done here as elsewhere. In sum, then, the pluralistic
approach recommends that both states and individuals in the West do their best to
reduce poverty elsewhere, whatever that may mean. It seems sensible to suggest that
this will involve both increased funding for global poverty alleviation and better use
of those funds.
Of course, some will still reject such measures since they continue to reject the
moral objective of global poverty alleviation, perhaps for nationalist, realist or (right)
libertarian reasons. Such reasons may be disputed on their own terms,61 but there is
undoubtedly some underlying diﬀerence of opinion. I hope to have given some
indication of the breadth and depth of the moral reasoning available on one side of
this divide.
58 Jeﬀrey D. Sachs, The End of Poverty (London: Penguin, 2005), p. 246.
59 William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 334; see also
pp. 5, 335.
60 Ibid., p. 26.
61 It is not, for example, clear that those who adhere to Nozickian libertarianism should be indiﬀerent
to current world poverty, since that poverty may have arisen through historical processes which they
recognise as unjust. This would seem to be an implication of a wider point made by Alasdair
MacIntryre: ‘The property-owners of the modern world are not the legitimate heirs of Lockean
individuals who performed quasi-Lockean (‘quasi’ to allow for Nozick’s emendations of Locke) acts
of original acquisition; they are the inheritors of those who, for example, stole, and used violence to
steal the common lands of England from the common people, vast tracts of North America from
the American Indian, much of Ireland from the Irish, and Prussia from the original non-German
Prussians’ (After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1981)), p. 234; cf. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and
Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974).
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